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In 2008, African swine fever was introduced into Geor-
gia, after which it spread to neighboring Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, and the Russian Federation. That same year, PCR 
and sequence analysis identifi ed African swine fever virus 
in samples from 3 dead female wild boars in northwestern 
Iran. Wild boars may serve as a reservoir.
African swine fever (ASF) is a notifi able, highly con-tagious, lethal, hemorrhagic disease in domestic pigs 
(1,2). ASF virus (ASFV) (International Committee on Tax-
onomy of Viruses database no. 00.002.0.01.001), an envel-
oped double-stranded DNA virus, is the only known DNA 
arbovirus (3). Maintenance and transmission of ASFV in-
volves cycling of virus between soft ticks of the genus Or-
nithodoros and wild pigs (warthogs, bush pigs, and giant 
forest boars) (1,2). The virus can also be acquired through 
ingestion of contaminated feed.
The syndrome caused by ASFV in pigs was initially 
described in Kenya and later in most other African coun-
tries (1,4). In Africa, it causes a long-term, persistent infec-
tion in warthogs and bush pigs (2,3,5). Clinical diagnosis 
of ASF is diffi cult because signs of ASF and other hem-
orrhagic diseases are similar and because virulence varies 
among ASFV isolates (1,2,5,6). 
In June 2007, ASFV was identifi ed in the Caucasus 
region, including Georgia, Russian Federation, and Ar-
menia (2). Diagnosis near the port of Poti, Georgia, was 
based on clinical fi ndings, and virus identifi cation was later 
confi rmed by laboratory investigations. ASFV might have 
been introduced into Georgia by ships carrying contami-
nated pork or pork products from other countries. After en-
tering Georgia, the virus extended into Armenia in August 
2007. The probable route of virus entry into Armenia was 
movement of infected pigs and wild boars across the border 
(7). By the end of 2007, an outbreak had occurred in Ye-
revan and Ararat, after which 1 additional case occurred in 
February 2008. 
In December 2007, the Russian Federation reported its 
fi rst ASF outbreak since the 1970s. The virus may have en-
tered through neighboring Georgia (7,8). In January 2008, 
presence of ASF was offi cially confi rmed in northwest 
Azerbaijan, ≈180 km east of the Georgia border (village of 
Nic). Because most residents of Nic keep pigs in backyard 
smallholdings, ASFV may have entered Nic in contaminat-
ed pork (or pork products) or in infected wild boars (7,8). 
In December 2008 and January 2009, ASFV spread to 
wild boars in northwestern Iran. As in Georgia, initial diag-
nosis was based on clinical signs and postmortem examina-
tion. Virus identifi cation was subsequently confi rmed by 
laboratory investigations. 
The Study
The wild boar population in northwestern Iran is 
12,000–13,000. Boars affected by ASFV show weakness, 
diffi culty walking, dragging of the hind legs, dysentery, 
and sudden death. The fi rst report of dead boars came from 
2 villages (Oshdibin, and Namngah) in the Jolfa area and 
then from other cities such as Ahar, Sarab, Maragheh, and 
Marand. The disease spread to the city of Khoie, located 
in another province (West Azarbaijan). Postmortem histo-
pathologic investigations of tissue samples of 3 dead, fe-
male, wild boars found characteristic signs of ASF, such 
as disseminated intravascular coagulation with multiple 
hemorrhages (Figure).
Viral DNA from 6 tissue samples (kidney, liver, lung, 
large intestine, heart, and spleen) from the 3 dead boars was 
extracted by using the JETQUICK Tissue DNA Spin Kit 
(GENOMED GmbH, Lohne, Germany) according to the 
manufacturer’s instructions. ASFV was detected by PCR 
and SYBR Green real-time PCR on a Rotor-Gene 65H0 
(Corbett Life Sciences, Sydney, New South Wales, Austra-
lia) in all samples from each boar; primers used were P72 
D, U (major capsid protein), and PPA1,2 (in the viral pro-
tein 73 coding region of the genome) (6,9). Melting curve 
analysis showed that an elevated temperature of 86.7°C 
could generate a specifi c peak in this curve. The sequences 
of the PCR products derived by using PPA primer pairs 
were analyzed by using BLAST (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
blast/Blast.cgi) and showed 100% similarity to submitted 
sequences of Georgia isolates. A partial sequence of the 
isolates from Iran has been submitted to GenBank under 
accession no. FJ897727.
Conclusions
To confi rm a specifi c pathogen and trace the possible 
sources of infection, genetic characterization of the virus 
strain associated with disease is crucial (1,2). Real-time 
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PCR and PCR are the most practical ways to differentiate in-
fectious agents that cause similar clinical signs (5,6,9). The 
100% similarity between our isolates and those from Geor-
gia suggests that they might have originated from Georgia, 
probably brought into Iran by infected wild boars crossing 
the Aras River during the disease incubation period.
The main obstacles to ASF eradication are wildlife 
reservoirs, limited ability to control movement of infected 
pigs and wild boars, inadequate laboratory support for rap-
id and accurate diagnosis, and lack of an effective vaccine 
(4). Ornithodoros spp. ticks may contribute to virus persis-
tence in the Caucasus region, including northwestern Iran. 
Although in our study ticks were not detected on the boar 
carcasses, they should be considered as potential transmis-
sion vectors. O. lahorensis ticks are found in areas with a 
cold climate and are mainly found near sheep and cows, 
so they are not likely to be isolated from an animal. In the 
absence of Ornithodoros spp. ticks, transmission to pigs 
could occur through contact with infected pigs or through 
feeding of virus-contaminated products (7,8).
The pig industry differs among Caucasus countries. In 
Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and southern Russian Federation, 
the pig industry is not as large as it is in Georgia and Ar-
menia (7). In these countries with limited or no pig farms, 
the virus could be spread by infected wild boars, and the 
disease could become endemic as it has in Spain and Sar-
dinia (3,7,8,10–12). Because Iran has no commercial pig 
facilities, the ASFV reservoir would be wild boars, which 
could transmit disease to neighboring countries that have 
pig industries, resulting in considerable economic losses.
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Figure. Acute form of African swine fever in wild boars. A) Petechial and larger ecchymotic hemorrhages beneath the epicardium. B) 
Severe hyperemia and petechial and larger ecchymotic hemorrhages in mucosa of urinary bladder. These hemorrhages are common 
in acute infectious fever and hemorrhagic diathesis. C) Blood-tinged colon contents with fecal balls covered by thick, blood-stained 
mucus. D) Congestion and fi brinous thromboses in pulmonary vessels and thickening of alveoli (hematoxylin and eosin stain; original 
magnifi cation ×100). E) Fibrinous thrombus in a venule within interlobular adipose tissue of the thyroid gland (hematoxylin and eosin stain; 
original magnifi cation ×200). F) Blood vessel congestion, perivascular hemorrhage, lymphocytic perivascular cuffi ng, and infi ltration with 
degenerating lymphocytes (hematoxylin and eosin stain; original magnifi cation ×200).
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